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On Locating Disaster 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
 
Imagine a man, unknown to you, standing in your backyard calmly clasping and 
unclasping his hands three times each hour. If we ask "What is he doing?" we would not 
likely be satisfied with these words: "He's clasping his hands three times per hour." 
There is something unnerving about the whole scene, not only because we cannot 
comprehend the point of clasping one's hands three times per hour, we want to know 
"What's  he doing in my back yard?"1  
There is a similarly unnerving quality about the description of the Columbia 
disaster as posed by the case study. By it we are tempted to equate the task of moral 
reasoning with the assignment of blame. Rodney Rocha, the engineer who chairs the 
Debris Assessment Team, strongly objected to the decision by Linda Ham (chair of the 
Mission Management Team) to withdraw pleas made to the Department of Defense for 
assistance by satellite and ground facilities in order to obtain higher resolution images 
of the shuttle while in flight. Ham, whose call it was to make, reasoned that further 
imaging was too expensive and frankly, too late to be of any use. Rocha insisted Ham's 
decision was "wrong" and "bordering on irresponsible" because both the stakes and the 
                                                   
1 Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in Virtues and Vices (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1978). 
2 
probability of failure were high enough to trump all consideration of costs and 
practicality. Thus one engineer is pitted against another. We in turn wrestle to assign 
blame so that we can breathe a sigh of relief. 
However, if we are honest with ourselves, affixing blame would not entirely remove 
our sense of unease. Like the description of the stranger (factual as far as it goes)—"he's 
clasping his hands three times per hour"—we suspect that there is  something missing 
from the description, and consequently something anemic about our moral reasoning 
about this tragedy. 
Sometimes a fresh insight can be generated by the most surprising of conversation 
partners. All but forgotten, 12th-century mystical theologian Hugh of St. Victor, once 
wrote that all of creation labors against an inevitable corruption attributable to "sin." 
Regardless of sin's origins, the reality of the human condition is twofold. In  the first 
place, this physical world is not Eden. In modern parlance, entropy increases, things fall 
apart, and only by expending great energy can disaster be averted, and then only 
sometimes. In Hugh's mind, figuring out how best to do this was the provenance of the 
engineer; mechanical arts have to do with fortifying the body against hunger and harm 
and contriving "remedies" for alleviating physical weaknesses resulting from the 
corruption of creation by sin.2 Hugh seems to make a good point: there is a sense in 
which the question, "Who is right between Ham and Rocha?" reduces to "Whose 
mechanical reasoning is sharper?" In the end, moral reasoning comes down to 
"engineering judgment." Unfortunately, those of us who are under-trained in 
engineering are thus constrained to be spectators to their debate. 
                                                   
2 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, trans. Jerome Taylor from the Latin with an Introduction and 
Notes (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1961), I.8.  Apparently Hugh took Genesis 1-3 as 
realistic, if not historical. 
3 
In the second place, Hugh also maintained that human beings are depraved. In 
other words, humans can never be fully trusted. They are not only capable of enormous 
intentional evil (Hitler), but also of lesser sins of omission due to illness, physical 
fatigue, inadequate training as well as darker reasons such as laziness, inattention, 
selfishness and the will-to-power. Again Hugh makes a useful point. We ought to 
consider whether engineering judgment can be skewed when one has an ax to grind is 
bucking for promotion.  
But there is more going on in this case than the Rocha-Ham rivalry. If we expand 
the horizon of description slightly, we learn that "this mission was a yawn—a low-
priority 'science' flight forced onto NASA by Congress and postponed for two years 
because of a more pressing schedule of construction deliveries to the International 
Space Station."3 Forced? If Langewiesche's report is taken at face value, we see that the 
context of the Columbia disaster not only involved a conflict between two engineers but 
also a power struggle between two institutions jockeying for control over a big ticket 
item; a single shuttle flight costs $300 million.4 NASA was intent on utilizing this flight 
to deliver materials for building the International Space Station. But at the end of the 
day, Congress controls the purse strings with the result that this flight was launched "as 
much to clear the books as to add to human knowledge."5 Once the broader picture 
begins to emerge we get the sinking feeling that something has gone awry, that science is 
infected by power politics. 
                                                   
3 William Langewiesche, Columbia's Last Flight (Atlantic Monthly, Nov 2003 [cited 11 May 2004]); 
available from http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-
bin/send.cgi?page=http%3A//www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/11/langewiesche.htm. 
4 Nasa's Assumed Baseline Space Shuttle Launch Costs through 2020 Applicable to the Nasa Space 
Transportation Architecture Study ([cited 12 May 2004]); available from 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codea/codeae/documentc.html. 
5 Langewiesche, Columbia's Last Flight ([cited). 
4 
The tainting of science by issues of power would not surprise Hugh. What would 
surprise him is our seeming unawareness of what science and engineering is for. 
Activities such as growing food more efficiently, protecting the body from harm, and 
alleviating physical weakness are penultimate goal. The ultimate goal is reunion with 
God and love of neighbor. What is easily overlooked in the Columbia disaster is not only 
the struggle between NASA and Congress, but the apparent disconnect of the space 
program from greater human goods.  
Langeweische summarizes the significance of the Columbia flight this way,  
it had gone nowhere except into low Earth orbit, around the globe every 
ninety minutes for sixteen days, carrying the first Israeli astronaut, and 
performing a string of experiments, many of which, like the shuttle program 
itself, seemed to suffer from something of a make-work character—the 
examination of dust in the Middle East (by the Israeli, of course); the ever 
popular ozone study; experiments designed by schoolchildren in six countries 
to observe the effect of weightlessness on spiders, silkworms, and other 
creatures; an exercise in "astroculture" involving the extraction of essential 
oils from rose and rice flowers, which was said to hold promise for new 
perfumes; and so forth.6 
Perhaps not exactly a "wasted" mission. But how are we to think about the costs of the 
space program in light of global needs? With an average of eight flights per year, the 
space shuttle program cost $2.4 billion each year. But that is pittance in light of the 
estimated cost projected for the International Space Station: $100 billion over the 
course of its lifetime.7 One hundred billion dollars. That is enough money to retire the 
national debts of Sudan, Cote D'Ivoire, Angola, Myanmar, Yemen, Republic of Congo, 
Honduras, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Bolivia, Somalia, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Ghana, Mali, 
Senegal, Liberia, Cameroon, Uganda, Malawi, Togo, Guinea, Burundi, Madagascar, 
                                                   
6 Ibid.([cited). 
7 Tony Freemantle and Mike Tolson, Space Station Had Political Ties in Tow (Houston Chronicle, 
2003 [cited 12 May 2004]); available from 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/space/iss/2004947. 
5 
Benin, Central African Republic, Zambia, Chad, Nicaragua, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, Guyana, Rwanda, Gambia, and Sierra Leone combined. In fact, $100 billion is 
fourteen times more than the total spent by all of these governments health and 
education for their people.8 Where is real the real disaster? 
 
                                                   
8 Most recent figures are from 1998  and 1999.  See 
http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/hipc/progress_report/countrynominal.htm and 
http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/databank/debttables/debtdata98.htm.  
